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The Right in the Good: A Defense of Teleological Non-Consequentialism 
Clayton Littlejohn 
King's College London 
 
Abstract: There has been considerable discussion recently of consequentialist 
justifications of epistemic norms. In this paper, I shall argue that these justifications 
are not justifications. The consequentialist needs a value theory, a theory of the 
epistemic good. The standard theory treats accuracy as the fundamental epistemic 
good and assumes that it is a good that calls for promotion. Both claims are mistaken. 
The fundamental epistemic good involves accuracy, but it involves more than just 
that. The fundamental epistemic good is knowledge, not mere true belief, because the 
goodness of an epistemic state is connected to that state's ability to give us reasons. If 
I'm right about the value theory, this has a number of significant implications for the 
consequentialist project. First, the good-making features that attach to valuable full 
beliefs are not features of partial belief. The resulting value theory does not give us 
the values we need to give consequentialist justifications of credal norms. Second, the 
relevant kind of good does not call for promotion. It is good to know, but the rational 
standing of a belief is not determined by the belief's location in a ranked set of 
options. In the paper's final section, I explain why the present view is a kind of 
teleological non-consequentialism. There is a kind of good that is prior to the right, 
but as the relevant kind of good does not call for promotion the value theory shows us 
what is wrong with the consequentialist project. 
 
1. Introduction 
Moore never said that the only possible reason that can justify any belief is that its 
formation would result in the greatest amount of what is good.1  This omission is 
surprising. Given his interests in epistemology and his consequentialist instincts, we 
could have expected him to say just this.2  Did Moore miss out on a good thing?  
Might our beliefs be right or rational because of the role that they play in promoting 
the epistemic good?   
 An increasing number of epistemologists seem to think so.3  Starting from the 
idea that accuracy is the fundamental epistemic good, epistemic consequentialists try 
                                                        
1 For helpful discussion, I would like to thank audiences at Bristol, King's College 
London, LSE and the University of Konstanz as well as anonymous referees for this 
volume, Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij, Maria Alvarez, Jochen Briesen, Jennifer Carr, 
Charles Cote-Bouchard, Jeff Dunn, Julien Dutant, Kenny Easwaran, Anna-Maria 
Eder, Catherine Elgin, Branden Fitelson, John Hawthorne, Hilary Greaves, Mark Eli 
Kalderon, Jason Konek, Eliot Michaelson, David Papineau, Richard Pettigrew, Josh 
Schechter, Florian Steinberger, Ralph Wedgwood, and Jose Zalabardo.  
2 In Principia Ethica, Moore said, "The only possible reason that can justify any 
action is that by it the greatest possible amount of what is good absolutely should be 
realized" (1993: 153). 
3 See Ahlstrom-Vij and Dunn (2014), Dorst (MS), Easwaran and Fitelson (2015), 
Goldman (1986), Greaves (2014), Joyce (1998, 2009, MS), Konek and Levinstein 
(MS), Pettigrew (2013, 2014, 2015), and Talbot (2014) for discussions of epistemic 
norms that are (to varying degrees) sympathetic to the consequentialist idea that the 
epistemic good determines the epistemic right. These writers are all sympathetic to 
the idea that the fundamental epistemic good is true belief, so we can see some of the 
arguments here as challenges to some of the assumptions operative in their work. 
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to determine which norms govern belief.  If you wanted to know why we should be 
probabilistically coherent, epistemic consequentialism gives you a plausible answer.  
Given some plausible assumptions about how to score the accuracy of a set of 
credences a coherent set can never be dominated by an incoherent alternative.  Most 
people don't like to be dominated, so maybe this will move you to keep your 
credences in order even if you aren't moved by a fear of Dutch bookies.  If you were 
struggling to decide whether it's possible to be rational and inconsistent because you 
were pulled in different directions by lottery and preface cases, you might think that it 
is interesting and important that the cost of conforming to some consistency norm is 
steep.  In some situations, the way to maximize expected accuracy is to keep an 
inconsistent set of beliefs. Perhaps the wise person ought to proportion her beliefs to 
the evidence and ignore the putative principles people appeal to in an attempt to 
defend the virtues of consistency.4  
 While the current literature is filled with lots of interesting results about the 
costs and benefits of conforming to various (putative) epistemic norms, it suffers from 
two serious deficiencies.  First, there hasn't yet been enough discussion of the value 
theory used by epistemic consequentialists.  While the veritists are right that there's 
something bad about believing falsehoods and often something good about believing 
truths, their account doesn't capture what's bad or good about it.  Second, there hasn't 
yet been enough discussion of whether the right and the good are related in the way 
the consequentialist takes them to be.  Once we see why the veritists are wrong about 
the fundamental epistemic values, we will see why the consequentialist justifications 
of epistemic norms are problematic. The paper concludes with a brief presentation of 
a teleological alternative to consequentialism.  
 
2. Truth and Consequences 
Suppose we were to pursue Moore's methods in epistemology. If we adopt Moore’s 
basic theoretical orientation and try to identify the norms governing belief, we would 
have to assume that the epistemic good is prior to the epistemic right: 
Priority Thesis: The good is metaphysically prior to the right.  
To determine what makes right belief right or rational belief rational, we would have 
to identify the fundamental epistemic good or goods.  The standard proposal about the 
epistemic good is a veritist proposal that says that truth or accuracy is the fundamental 
epistemic good.  We would use this account of the good to give an account of the 
better and best.   
 If our consequentialists are veritists who see accuracy as the fundamental 
epistemic good, we should expect them to accept the following:  
Necessity Thesis: Only accurate states are epistemically 
good. 
Sufficiency Thesis: Every accurate belief is epistemically 
good. 5 
                                                        
4 For interesting defenses of the virtue of consistency that appeal to principles of the 
sort we would expect consequentialists to attack, see Ryan (1996). 
5  Strictly speaking, these claims are claims about final goodness. An anonymous 
referee reminded me that actual veritists (e.g., Goldman (1999) think that the value 
realized by our beliefs depends upon things like the significance or importance of the 
relevant accurate states. I wanted to avoid these complications because they are 
orthogonal to the issues discussed here. None of the objections discussed below can 
be met by distinguishing interesting from uninteresting truths, for example.    
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Distinctiveness Thesis: The beliefs that are epistemically 
good are distinctively valuable. 
Monism: The fundamental epistemic good is accuracy. 
Roughly, this captures the idea that accuracy is the good-making feature of the beliefs 
that are good and that accurate belief plays a unique role in determining how well 
things are going.  These theses all play important roles in consequentialist arguments 
for their favored epistemic norms because they tell us what does and does not matter 
when it comes to ranking options.   
 There are two further theses to consider when thinking about ranking options 
in terms of the value they contain and the kind of value such rankings are sensitive to:  
Totalizing Thesis: The right is determined by comparing 
the total value that options would/could realize.6 
Promotion Thesis: If an option is acceptable and an 
alternative is at least as valuable, it must also be 
acceptable.7   
The Totalizing Thesis reminds us that the ranking of options that determines the 
rational status of our attitudes is done in terms of the total value that these options 
contain.  The thesis plays an important role in justifications of consequentialism. As 
Foot (1984) observed, the reason that consequentialism seems so compelling is that 
when it comes to the good, the better, and the best, it is irrational to prefer some 
acknowledged lesser good to one that is greater. The Promotion Thesis tells us that 
the rational status of the attitudes contained in an option will be wholly determined by 
the value contained in those options. This rules out the possibility that there might be 
some principle that functions like a side-constraint, forcing us to opt for a suboptimal 
option by making it impermissible to opt for some superior alternative.8 
 Our epistemic consequentialists should agree to this much, but they might 
disagree about the kind or kinds of accuracy that matter.  An epistemic 
consequentialist concerned with full belief might adopt this value theory: 
Categorical Veritism: True belief is intrinsically good, 
false belief is intrinsically bad, and these are the only 
intrinsic values that matter to inquiry (Goldman 1999). 
One concerned with partial belief might adopt this one:  
Gradational Veritism: The categorical good of fully 
believing truths is replaced by the gradational good of 
investing high credence in truths (the higher the better); 
the categorical evil of fully believing falsehoods is 
replaced by the gradational evil of investing high 
credence in falsehoods (the higher the worse) (Joyce 
MS). 
                                                        
6 For discussion, see Carlson (1995). 
7 For discussion, see Vallentyne (2006). 
8 Pettigrew (2013a) reads Easwaran and Fitelson's (2012) challenge as involving an 
appeal to side-constraints. I should mention that I don't think we need side-constraints 
in the fight against epistemic consequentialism. We only need to invoke them if we 
concede that certain options should be ranked in such a way that the best options 
strike us as inappropriate. If you don't see much good contained in the inappropriate 
options, the side-constraints become otiose. Like many consequentialists, I'm 
skeptical of side-constraints because they often seem to be ad hoc.  
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As stated, these are competing views about the bearers of epistemic value. The first 
view sees full belief as the only thing that could be epistemically good. The second 
says that partial beliefs can be good even if they don't constitute full beliefs and 
doesn't think it matters whether some partial belief is, inter alia, a full belief.  My 
impression is that many of the leading consequentialists are open to a kind of hybrid 
view on which full belief and partial belief are both potential bearers of epistemic 
value.  If we define 'accuracy' broadly enough, we can say that the fundamental 
veritist commitment is to the thesis that accurate states are the positive epistemic 
value atoms and that inaccurate ones are the negative value atoms.9    
 Not all consequentialists are maximizers, but it will simplify the discussion to 
speak as if they are.10  According to maximizing epistemic consequentialism, it's only 
possible to say which beliefs are rational once we've found some way of ranking the 
agent's options and seen which options contain the relevant attitude.  Roughly, an 
attitude is rational iff this attitude is included in the best feasible option(s). This 
requires two points of clarification. First, we will think of the outcome as the possible 
world that would be actual if the agent were to have the attitudes contained in the 
relevant option.  Second, remember that some writers use 'best' to refer to the 
objectively best and others to refer to the prospectively best where the former is 
understood in terms of actual value and the latter in terms of expected value. 
 It's easy to see how to rank options if Categorical Veritism is true.  On this 
view we would say that the total value realized by your epistemic state in a world is 
identical to the total value realized by your doxastic state in that world. Your 
epistemic state is composed of your doxastic state (i.e., your full beliefs) and your 
credal state (i.e., your partial beliefs).  We would assign some positive value to each 
true belief and then subtract out some negative value from each false belief. 11  
                                                        
9 I'm borrowing this talk of value atoms from Bradley (2009: 5). Think of the value 
atoms as the things that are most fundamentally good or bad. They are things that 
don't derive their value from the value contained in their proper parts and that 
incorporate all the properties involved in the realization of the value. Together, the 
value atoms determine how well or badly things are going for you.  We might say that 
accurate states are to the veritist what hedons and dolors are to the hedonist. 
10 An anonymous referee observed (quite rightly) that this is an understatement as 
reliabilism appears to some to be the most popular form of consequentialism and 
reliabilists are not maximizers. (Although, it is debatable whether reliabilism truly is a 
version of consequentialism. See Goldman (2015) and Littlejohn (2012).)  It would 
complicate the discussion considerably to discuss satisficing and maximizing views, 
so I thought it would be best to stick with a maximizing view and focus on objections 
that would apply with equal force to any satisficing view (provided that the suitable 
modifications are made).  This is because the objections (suitably modified) apply to 
any view that takes permissibility to supervene upon outcomes and the maximizers 
and satisficers agree that permissibility supervenes upon the value realized by 
outcomes.  The main difference between the maximizers and satisficers is that the 
maximizers think we are permitted only to bring about the best and the satisficers 
think that we are permitted to bring about anything that is good enough and allows 
that there can be things that are good enough that are suboptimal. Neither view has 
resources to explain why we should not bring about options that are better than a 
permitted option and some of the challenges discussed below have that shape.       
11 In Littlejohn (2012) I argued that if we wanted to explain in consequentialist terms 
why it's wrong to believe p on the basis of weak evidence or unreliable methods we 
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Suppose you wonder whether this exit is the way to San Jose. You might believe that 
it is, believe that it is not, or suspend. It might be the way. It might not.  If it is, 
believing that it is should count positively. If it is not, believing that it is should count 
negatively. If you suspend, the suspension should not count either way. To rank the 
options using an objective version of Categorical Veritism, we would have to 
compare the total epistemic value your doxastic state could realize if you believed that 
this was the way to San Jose to the total epistemic value your epistemic state could 
realize if you suspended or disbelieved. We would want to hold fixed the fact that this 
was (or was not) the way to San Jose. It might seem that believing that it is on the 
condition that it is will rank higher than suspending or disbelieving, but this overlooks 
some complications that we'll come back to later. 
 It's harder to see how to rank options if Gradational Veritism is true.  The 
standard story goes something like this.12 We begin by identifying the ideal state. This 
is the state in which you are maximally confident in all the truths (or all the truths you 
can grasp or all the truths you have attitudes concerning) and maximally unconfident 
in all the falsehoods (or all the falsehoods you can grasp or all the falsehoods you 
have attitudes concerning).  This is the ideal because it's supposed to be ideally 
accurate.  Whenever you are less than maximally confident in some truth, you deviate 
from the ideal. The less confident you are in a truth, the greater your deviation from 
the ideal.  To determine how far off you are from the ideal, we sum up the deviation 
of each partial belief from the ideal.  
 The methods we are given for ranking options do not tell us how to answer 
two important questions about the value of credal states.  We don't know what sort of 
value the ideal state realizes. We also don't know what sort of value the non-ideal 
state realizes. First, if all we know about states that include non-extremal credences is 
that they are at some distance from the ideal, it seems that we have a potentially 
powerful argument for skepticism. If we know apriori that any credal state that 
involves some non-extremal credence is worse than the ideal, it might be irrational to 
be in such a state. Suppose that it is possible to assign no credences whatever to the 
propositions we grasp. And suppose that the total value realized by the ideal state is 
also 0. If so, it would be irrational to have a credal state that involved any non-
extremal credence.   
 Of course, a proponent of Gradational Veritism might say in response that 
some positive good does come of having the ideal credal state. This might help to 
mitigate part of the problem, but only if we have a further story about how defective 
states could nevertheless rank higher than states of universal suspension (or a state 
that assigns extremal credence to a handful of obvious logical truths).  We need an 
argument that shows that you can be better off by being in a non-ideal state than you 
would be if you were to suspend across the board or suspend on all the non-
tautologies. 
                                                                                                                                                              
would have to say that the values of true and false belief differed in magnitude so that 
it's worse to believe one truth and one falsehood than to believe nothing at all.  Dorst 
(MS) calls this the conservativeness constraint.  Using the lottery case, I argued that 
consequentialists will never get the threshold right, but that argument rested on two 
controversial assumptions. The first is that it's not rational to believe lottery 
propositions outright. The second is that it can be rational to believe things on the 
basis of testimony even when the probability of erring by so relying is greater than it 
would be if we were to believe that the tickets we hold for large lotteries will lose.    
12 See Joyce (1998) and Pettigrew (2013). 
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 At the root of these problems is this concern. If we wanted to model our value 
theory on, say, hedonism, and model our consequentialist view on utilitarianism, we 
need to see the states assessed for accuracy as value atoms that function like hedons 
and dolors. In the case of full belief, it is easy to see how this is supposed to go. Treat 
a true belief like a hedon, treat a false belief like a dolor, operate on the assumption 
that the best option maximizes these values, and work from there. In the case of 
partial belief, it is hard to see how this is supposed to work. Should we think of a 
partial belief that doesn't amount to full belief as more like a hedon if it's closer to the 
truth than not or should we see it as more like a dolor because it deviates from the 
ideal? We have decent enough formal tools for ranking options when limited to fixed 
sets of propositions, but I don't see how these materials could answer some basic 
questions about whether it's rational to get into the partial belief game if and when it 
can be avoided. 
 These worries extend to the hybrid views that tell us that both partial beliefs 
and full beliefs are potential bearers of epistemic goodness. The hybrid view faces a 
further worry, which is that it is difficult to say what sort of value we should attach to 
an element of the subject's epistemic state if it is both a partial belief and a full belief.  
Suppose you work with a kind of Lockean view according to which full belief just is a 
partial belief that is sufficiently confident.13 Suppose that while I'm not maximally 
confident in p, I am sufficiently confident in p to count as having a full belief.  By 
crossing the line, I would get some boost in total value (or decrease gradational 
inaccuracy) simply by increasing confidence in some truth. I would get a further boost 
in value by having a full belief in a true proposition.  Is this double counting? 
 While I have some real concerns about the possibility of fleshing out the story 
to provide satisfactory answers to these questions, I want to move on. The real 
problem with combining veritism with epistemic consequentialism has little to do 
with the details and more to do with the operative assumptions about epistemic 
goodness (e.g., that the good of true belief calls for promotion and that such value is 
the fundamental epistemic good).  The veritist works with a dubious value theory.  
The most fundamental problem with this project is the way that the veritist 
understands the value of accuracy.  Work out your own way of filling out the missing 
details however you see fit. I don't think that on any admissible modification of the 
basic structure will we find a plausible view of epistemic norms.  
 
3. The Value of Truth and the Varieties of Veritism 
If you're looking for a careful defense of the idea that true belief is valuable, you will 
not find it in discussions of epistemic consequentialism. Veritism often acts as the 
unmotivated motivator. The most sophisticated discussion of the value of truth that 
I've found is in Lynch's work, so I want to see whether his arguments support the sort 
of veritist view that the consequentialists need. 
 Lynch makes an initial pitch for the value of truth in this passage:  
Nobody likes to be wrong. If anything is a truism, that 
is. And it reveals something else we believe about truth: 
that it is good. More precisely, it is good to believe what 
is true (2004: 12).  
Even if everyone had this preference, this observation doesn't provide much support 
for the idea that there's something good that attaches to each true belief. It only 
                                                        
13 For sympathetic presentations of the Lockean view, see Dorst (MS), Foley (2009), 
and Sturgeon (2008).  
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suggests that there's something bad about being mistaken.  At best, this is a point in 
favor of the Necessity Thesis, one that tells us nothing about the Sufficiency Thesis. If 
people are risk averse and hate to make mistakes, what could entice them to take a 
risk?   
  Lynch provides a more promising line of argument in this passage:  
If truth was not a basic preference, then if I had two 
beliefs B1 and B2 with identical instrumental value, I 
should not prefer to believe B1 rather than B2. The 
considerations above already point to the fact that this 
isn’t so, however. In particular, if we didn’t have a basic 
preference for the truth, it would be hard to explain why 
we find the prospect of being undetectably wrong so 
disturbing. Think about a modification of the experience-
machine scenario we began with. Some super 
neuroscientists give you the choice between continuing 
to live normally, or having your brain hooked up to a 
supercomputer that will make it seem as if you are 
continuing to live normally (even though you’re really 
just floating in a vat somewhere). When in the vat, you 
will continue to have all the same experiences you would 
have in the real world. Because of this, you would 
believe that you are reading a book, that you are hungry, 
and so on. In short, your beliefs and experiences will be 
the same, but most of your beliefs will be false (2004: 
17). 
He then offers these remarks about this thought experiment and experiments like it:  
If we didn’t really prefer true beliefs to false ones, we 
would be simply ambivalent about this choice. Vat, no 
vat; who cares? But we don’t say this. We don’t want to 
live in the vat, even though doing so would make no 
difference to what we experience or believe. This 
suggests that we have a basic preference for truth (2004: 
17).  
 
Neither would I wish to live in the fool’s paradise, where 
people just pretend to like and respect me. These 
examples, and others like them, show that we value 
something more than experience—even just pleasurable 
experience. We want certain realities behind those 
experiences, and thus we want certain propositions to be 
true. (2004, pp. 138–39). 
This suggests that something of value might be missing from our lives even if our 
lives were quite pleasant and that this value has to do with truth.  He offers this by 
way of elaboration:  
In preferring not to live in either the vat or the Russell 
world, I do not simply prefer that the world be a certain 
way. My preference involves my beliefs and their 
proper functioning, so to speak. For not only do I not 
want to live in a world where I am a brain in a vat, I 
also don’t want to live in a world where I am not so 
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deceived, but believe that I am. That is, if such and such 
is the case, I want to believe that it is, and if I believe 
that it is, I want it to be the case. We can put this by 
saying that I want my beliefs and reality to be a certain 
way—I want my beliefs to track reality, to “accord with 
how the world actually is”—which is to say I want them 
to be true (2004: 18). 
And this suggests that the reason that true belief matters is that it matters that we have 
a way to 'track reality'.  The last line suggests that he thinks that some sort of veritist 
view to do justice to intuitions about what's missing from life in Nozick's experience 
machine. I think there's something important and right here, but something that 
explains what's wrong with veritism.   
   
3.1 Niggling Doubts 
I have concerns about most of the veritist assumptions about value.  The 
Distinctiveness Thesis seems solid, though.  Belief plays a distinctive role in our 
psychology and its value seems to be tied to the role it plays. It tracks reality by 
helping us to keep hold of the facts. If we drop the thesis, it's hard to see how the 
epistemic consequentialist arguments could work.  If the Distinctiveness Thesis were 
false, we could get the goods that attach to accurate belief without belief. If the best 
options aren't best because they contain the best beliefs, it's hard to see how a norm 
that enjoins us to maximize some sort of epistemic value would require us to have the 
beliefs the consequentialist thinks we're required to have. 
 Armed with the Distinctiveness Thesis, we can cause trouble for the 
Sufficiency Thesis and Monism.  It is easy to see why Sufficiency is important for the 
standard consequentialist arguments. If Sufficiency were false, it should be possible 
for two epistemic states to score equally well when scored by veritists and yet differ 
in terms of their epistemic value. Were we to allow that these states could differ in 
value, we couldn't rely on arguments that equate the epistemic ideal with perfect 
accuracy and treat the imperatives to maximize expected accuracy and expected 
epistemic value as extensionally equivalent. 
 There is a prima facie plausible argument against Sufficiency, one that uses 
part of the standard story about epistemic goodness. Consider Distinctiveness. 
According to Distinctiveness, belief is the distinctive bearer of epistemic goodness. 
On a natural reading of Sufficiency, such states are good (when they are) because they 
are accurate.  On a standard story about belief and perception, both beliefs and 
perceptual experiences have accuracy conditions.14 Indeed, it is typically part of the 
typical story about these experiences and beliefs that they share content and share 
accuracy conditions.  If so, it would seem that Sufficiency would support a view on 
which both experience and belief share the very same good making features. So, they 
should both be good. So, it would seem that if experiences and beliefs can both be 
assessed for accuracy, we have to reject Sufficiency to account for the distinctive 
value of accurate belief.  
 In my view this argument rests on a mistaken assumption about experience.15 I 
don’t think experiences have representational content, so I don’t think that they have 
                                                        
14 See McDowell (1998), Siegel (2010), and Schellenberg (2014) for discussion. 
15  See Brewer (2011) and Travis (2013) for critical discussion of the view that 
experiences have representational content. In Littlejohn (Forthcoming), I argue that 
even if experiences had content, they wouldn't play the epistemological role that 
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the same good-making features that beliefs (allegedly) have. Experiences don't put us 
in touch with the facts in the same way that beliefs do. Most readers probably 
disagree with this point. If so, you have to answer a tricky question that I do not.  
How could belief be the distinctive bearer of epistemic goodness if it is not the 
distinctive bearer of the good-making features? 
 Because experience and belief are typically taken to be alike in possessing the 
properties that veritists identify as the good-making properties of belief, it might be 
worth asking veritists to explain why the putative good-making feature of good belief 
is a good-making feature. I know of only two answers to this question.  Both answers 
start from some claims about the point, purpose, or aim of belief. The first says that 
the aim of belief is truth. The idea is that a belief will have the good-making features 
iff it fulfills its aim by being a true and accurate representation of reality. The problem 
with this line is that it doesn't seem to give us the resources we need to explain the 
Distinctiveness Thesis. On the standard line about experience, experiences can have 
contents that can be assessed for accuracy in the way that beliefs can, in which case 
the challenge to the Distinctiveness Thesis remains. The second answer says that the 
aim of belief is to provide us with reasons. Specifically, they should provide us with 
potential motivating reasons (i.e., things that could function as our reasons for 
believing, feeling, or doing things). If we're guided by these reasons, we're guided by 
reality because these reasons consist of facts or true propositions.   
 This second way of thinking about the aim of belief and its good-making 
features helps to save the Distinctiveness Thesis. I have identified a role that beliefs 
play that experiences do not. (It also fits nicely with the nice story that Lynch gives us 
about the value of truth, but we'll get back to that later.)  Consider the experiences you 
had when you came to believe that your neighbor was stealing your Sunday paper.  In 
the absence of the belief that your neighbor was the thief, you couldn't have been 
upset with the neighbor for taking your paper. These experiences couldn't render the 
belief that rationalizes the reactive attitudes otiose. If you had the experiences but 
didn't have the belief, your reason for being upset with him could not be that he took 
the paper. To you, the fact that he took the paper would not make your anger 
intelligible because for all you know this fact is not a fact.  And if that wasn't your 
reason, it's quite possible that any negative feelings you had toward him wouldn't be 
fitting. Your emotional responses are fitting only when an accurate belief is there to 
guide your emotional responses.  
 To my mind, this story about the role that belief plays in supplying potential 
motivating reasons is the best story about why belief aims at the truth and why beliefs 
have distinctive good-making features. It allows us to sidestep the tricky issues about 
the nature of perceptual experience because even if we think that perceptual 
experiences do have representational content, we tend not to think that experience 
involves the kind of commitment to the truth of this content that belief does.  
Unfortunately, I think that this story about the good-making features of belief causes 
serious trouble for all versions of veritism and for epistemic consequentialism. Upon 
this rock, I shall make my mess. 
 
3.2 Against Gradational Veritism and the Hybrid View 
                                                                                                                                                              
people often assume.  Even if they had contents, our perceptual beliefs aren't cases in 
which we believe things for reasons.  Thus, belief plays a distinctive epistemic role in 
that it has to be in place for us to be guided by reasons. 
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In defending the Distinctiveness Thesis, I said that belief plays a distinctive role in 
certain kinds of folk-psychological explanation. I should be clear that I think full 
belief plays this role. Partial belief does not play this role.  If you are confident that p 
but you do not believe p, you cannot believe things, feel things, or do things for the 
reason that p. 
 Adler draws our attention to the fact that certain reactive-attitudes do not, as 
he puts it, ‘admit of epistemic qualification’:  
Mild resentment is never resentment caused by what one 
judges to be a serious offense directed toward oneself 
tempered by one’s degree of uncertainty in that judgment—for 
example, a student’s mildly resenting her teacher’s lowering 
her grade because she refused his persistent personal 
advances, although she is not sure that the grade wasn’t 
deserved. For similar reasons, there is no actually engaged 
attitude corresponding to a conditional resentment (anger), 
whose condition can only later be known to be fulfilled (2002: 
217).     
In the absence of the right kind of full belief, resentment isn’t possible. As Gordon 
noted in his discussion of attributions of emotions, many attributions of these 
emotions require a corresponding attribution of full belief. You couldn’t be angry 
about the fact that a grade was lowered unfairly unless (a) certain conditions obtained 
such that the belief that the grade was lowered unfairly would, when combined with 
these conditions, make you angry and (b) you did indeed believe your grade was 
lowered unfairly (1987: 48). 
 What is it about belief that equips it to play roles that experiences cannot? One 
answer is that only belief has propositional content, but this doesn't explain why full 
belief plays a distinctive role.  A better answer is that belief is distinctive in being 
committal. Belief involves a kind of commitment to truth that other attitudes and 
mental states do not. If it seems to you that p because of how your experiences are but 
you don’t believe it, you won’t be mistaken about p or right about p.  This feature of 
belief helps us understand why belief is a necessary condition on V-ing for the reason 
that p. To V for the reason that p, the (apparent) fact that p has to capture the light in 
which you took V-ing to be favorable, appropriate, right, etc. If you don’t take it to be 
the case that p, the apparent fact that p wouldn’t be an apparent fact. It thus couldn’t 
be the light in which you took V-ing to be favorable, appropriate, right, etc.  
 We have seen that you can use this feature of full belief and the role that full 
belief plays in providing us with potential motivating reasons to argue for 
Distinctiveness. Beliefs are unique in bearing the fundamental epistemic good-making 
properties because the good-making properties have to do with ‘tracking reality’ so 
that we believe, feel, and do things for reasons that consist of facts.   A nice feature of 
this account is that it helps to explain the Necessity Thesis. If a proposition you 
believe isn't true, it is not among the facts that would constitute reasons that could be 
our reasons for feeling, doing, or believing things. It would also explain why any false 
belief fails to do what beliefs are supposed to do. The false belief does not put us in 
touch with a fact that could rationally guide our actions, feelings, or thoughts. While 
this is a promising line of argument, it also gives us what we need to cause trouble for 
veritism.  
 Gradational veritism and the hybrid view both see credal states that don't 
constitute beliefs as states that can be epistemically good.  On the account of 
epistemic good just sketched, some accurate states are good because they're states that 
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can give us potential motivating reasons. Unfortunately, this is something that partial 
beliefs cannot do when they do not constitute full beliefs. Thus, they don't have the 
good-making feature that accounts for the value of the valuable full beliefs. Thus, if 
this is the sole fundamental epistemic good-making feature, gradational veritism and 
the hybrid views have to be mistaken. By failing to be full beliefs, these credal states 
cannot be good beliefs. The kind of accuracy they have isn't the kind of accuracy that 
accounts for the value realized by the full beliefs that are good beliefs.  
 
3.2 Against Categorical Veritism 
A crucial premise in the argument for Distinctiveness is the idea that the good-making 
properties are the properties in virtue of which beliefs ‘track reality’ and enable us to 
do, feel, or believe things for reasons that consist of facts. Since only true beliefs will 
have such properties, the premise supports Necessity. Since, however, some true 
beliefs will lack such properties, the premise also gives us the argument we need to 
reject Sufficiency. Just as Lynch appropriated Nozick’s experience machine for his 
purposes, I shall appropriate it for mine.  Lynch is right that there’s something 
missing from the experience machine, but it would be a mistake to think that what’s 
missing is accuracy.  A subject’s attitudes in the experience machine can be accurate 
even when that subject’s attitudes do not ‘track reality’. We can use Gettier cases to 
show that. Set the machine up to create a series of convincing appearances.  As events 
outside the machine unfold, there might be the occasional ‘match’. It might seem to 
the subject because of what’s happening in the machine that something very nice is 
happening. It might also be that this nice thing is happening. Maybe you smile 
because you believe that your sister was just awarded her doctorate. Maybe you do 
this just as this occurs. It couldn’t be that your reason for smiling is the fact that your 
sister has just been awarded the doctorate. That part of reality isn’t a part of reality 
that you track. Your attitudes might happen to match events in the external world, but 
they don’t thereby help these events or facts about them guide you in your thoughts, 
feelings, or deeds.  
 Two beliefs might score the same in terms of accuracy while differing in terms 
of whether they track reality. If the reason that some accurate beliefs are good is that 
these beliefs track reality, we have some reason to think that there’s not much that’s 
good about the accurate beliefs that fail to track reality. That is, we do if the point or 
purpose of belief is to put us in touch with the part of reality that consists of facts.  
Since I think that is what the point or purpose of belief is, I think that we can use the 
experience machine to undermine Sufficiency.  This isn’t the place to defend this, but 
I would suggest that only beliefs that constitute knowledge put you in a position to be 
guided by reasons that consist of facts.16 If this is correct, only those true beliefs that 
constitute knowledge will have the good-making properties that are distinctive to 
belief.  Since there can be differences between how accurate a subject’s beliefs are 
and whether these beliefs constitute knowledge, I think that there’s something 
seriously wrong with the way that Veritism in all its guises will rank options. In turn, 
I think that this should complicate the consequentialist arguments concerning putative 
epistemic norms.  
 
4 Knowledge and the Good 
                                                        
16 See Hyman (2015) for discussion and defense.  Gordon (1987) and Unger (1975) 
defend similar views, as do Littlejohn (2012) and Williamson (2000). 
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Once we see that there are true beliefs that do not track reality (e.g., accidentally true 
beliefs formed in Gettier cases), we can see why Lynch's observations don't support 
veritism (i.e., because they don't support the Sufficiency Thesis) and why the 
Sufficiency Thesis is so dubious.17 There's nothing good about the true beliefs that 
don't track reality, so there must be more to the fundamental epistemic good than 
mere accuracy.  If, as I've suggested, only knowledge tracks the parts of reality that 
consist of facts, the intuitions that Lynch appeals to support an alternative to veritism 
and suggest that it's a mistake to rank options using the veritist value theory. 
 Even if I am right that the Sufficiency Thesis is mistaken, it might seem that 
this tells us little about epistemic consequentialism.  The consequentialist is not 
committed to any particular account of epistemic goodness, so couldn't they adopt my 
preferred value theory?  
Gnosticism: Knowledge is the fundamental epistemic good, 
the fundamental epistemic disvalue is realized by belief that 
fails to constitute knowledge, and these are the only basic 
epistemic values and disvalues.18 
A move from veritism to gnosticism is independently motivated. Many 
epistemologists seem to think that it is better to know than to simply have a true 
belief.19 Gnosticism vindicates this intuition in a straightforward way. It also helps to 
solve (or dissolve) the swamping problem, a problem that seems to arise when we 
assign value to true belief and knowledge and then try to work out how knowledge 
could contain all the value contained in true belief along with some further value. If 
some true beliefs cannot do what beliefs are supposed to do (i.e., provide us with 
potential motivating reasons by putting us in touch with reality), we can see why the 
gnostic would think that the worries about swamping are misplaced. While there's 
much to be said for moving from veritism to gnosticism, this move only helps to 
highlight the problems with consequentialism.  
 There's some sense in which knowledge is good or it is good to know. In 
accepting this, what precisely have we accepted? Our talk of 'good', 'better', and 'best' 
is quite varied.  Let's consider four ways of trying to understand the gnostic view:  
Good Simpliciter: Knowledge is good simpliciter. The state 
of affairs of knowing a true proposition is among the states 
of affairs that are intrinsically good, states of affairs that 
have the goodness property, or states of affairs that are just 
plain good. 
Good For: Knowledge is good for the knower. It is good for 
the knower to know things. Knowledge is thus among the 
value atoms that determines whether things go well or badly 
for the knower. 
Good in a Way: Knowledge is good in a way. Just as a good 
toaster is good insofar as it can do what toasters are 
                                                        
17 Opinion might divide over whether this holds true for all kinds of Gettier cases. 
Hughes (2014) and Locke (2015) think that fake barn cases are trouble for the idea 
that knowledge is necessary. In my (2012) I relied on these objections to knowledge 
accounts of various kinds, but see Littlejohn (2014) for a response/retraction. 
18 In Littlejohn (2015), this view was dubbed 'conscientiaism' but I think 'gnosticism' 
is a much better name for the view. Thanks to Margot Strohminger for the name. 
(Matthew Benton suggested 'knosticism' but I think this took things to far!)  
19 See Kvanvig (2003).  
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supposed to do, a belief that constitutes knowledge might be 
a good belief in a way that's similar  
Normatively Good: Knowledge is good in the sense that it is 
good that you believe only if you know. It is good because 
such beliefs conform to the norm that governs belief.  
In which of these ways should the gnostic say that knowledge is good?20 
 
4.1 Good Simpliciter and Good For  
Moore thought that ‘good’ (often?) functions as a predicative adjective. In saying that 
some conduct was good conduct, he thought we said that it was conduct and that it 
was good. On this use, ‘good’ functions to attribute the property of being good to 
something (e.g., persons, conduct, states of affairs, etc.). On this use, if we say that 
this was good conduct and that she was a good person, we would be saying that this 
conduct and this woman shared a property in common. They would share the 
goodness property.  On this use if we said that Agnes was a good companion but not a 
good person, we would say, inter alia, that Agnes was good and that she was either 
not good or not a person.21         
 We also use 'good' to talk about things that are good for subjects. It might be 
thought that knowledge or true belief is good for the person, that her life is somehow 
improved just by the presence of knowledge or true belief. If the gnostic wanted, she 
could say that knowledge is good for people without any commitment to the idea that 
knowledge is good simpliciter.  There is no obvious inconsistency in saying that 
something is good for some person and denying that this thing is just plain good.  
(Nor is there any obvious inconsistency in saying that something is good even if we 
deny that it is good for someone.)   
 If knowledge were good in one of these two ways, this might seem to be good 
news for consequentialists who accept the Totalizing and Promotion Theses. If some 
states of affairs are good simpliciter, it would be plausible that things are going better 
when these states of affairs are prevalent and it would, in turn, be plausible to suggest 
that the proper mode of responding to such values would be to promote them. If there 
are epistemic standings that would be good for us to stand in, this might suggest that 
the more often we stood in these standings the better things would go for us. 
 Is knowledge good in either of these ways?  Some philosophers are skeptical 
of the idea that 'good' functions as a predicative adjective and skeptical of the idea 
that there are things that are just plain good.22 Such skepticism, if not put to rest, 
                                                        
20 Even if the reader holds some remaining sympathy for veritism, it is clear that 
many of the critical remarks below about certain versions of gnosticism apply mutatis 
mutandis to veritism. If, say, knowledge is not good simpliciter or good for you, say, 
it is pretty clear that true belief isn't good simpliciter or good for you. 
21 If Agnes is my lovely pet dog, this makes perfectly good sense. If, however, Agnes 
was a wonderful companion who was, inter alia, a terrible person, it would be harder 
to see how I could say this consistently. If we used 'good' as a predicative adjective 
and said that Agnes was not a good person, we would say that she was either not a 
person or not good. Since she was a person, we should be able to conclude that she 
was not good, but this is inconsistent with saying that she is both good and a 
companion.  In this context, it is clear that reading 'good' as a predicative adjective is 
completely unnatural. 
22 See Foot (1985) and Thomson (2008) for criticism of the Moorean view of 'good' 
and the goodness property. See Zimmerman (2001) for a response. 
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spells trouble for any veritist or gnostic who wants to vindicate intuitions about value 
by saying that true beliefs or instances of knowledge are things that bear the goodness 
property.  Why are philosophers skeptical of talk of the idea that some things might 
be good simplicter?  One worry is that it seems that we simply cannot use 'good' as a 
predicative adjective. If there is such a thing as the goodness property and it plays a 
useful role in our theory of epistemic norms, we should be able to grasp what it would 
be for something to be good simpliciter and express this thought using terms like 
'good'.  But it seems that we cannot because when we use 'good' in sentences of the 
form 'a is a good F' it seems the only admissible reading of that sentence is one on 
which 'good' functions as an attributive adjective, not a predicative one.23  If we 
thought that beliefs could be good simpliciter (if true or if they constituted 
knowledge) and thought that we could express this belief in language, we should be 
able to say that 'Such and such is a good belief' and get a reading according to which 
it entails both 'Such and such is a belief' and 'Such and such is good', but the way we 
read such sentences doesn't allow this. Consider, 'This is a good toaster' or 'Agnes is a 
good dog but a bad chef'.  
 Some people might think they grasp the truth of the view that some beliefs are 
good simpliciter but cannot express this in language or think that it can be expressed 
in language and deny the observation that 'good' functions exclusively as an 
attributive adjective in sentences of the form 'a is a good F'.  Fair enough. We will see 
that there's a second objection to this proposal, but let's first consider a second way of 
understanding the gnostic view. 
 On the first use of ‘good’ it seems that if things are good, things are better for 
it even if things are not better for anyone at all.  There is another use of ‘good’ 
according to which something is ‘good’ only if it is good for some subject. In this 
sense, the good has to do with the subject’s interests.  It’s an interesting question how 
these two notions of good are related. I don’t see any reason to think that if something 
has the property of being good that this involves something being good for some 
subject and I see no reason to think that whenever something is indeed good for some 
subject there is something that has the property of being good. Moore, recall, thought 
that it was analytic that if some option is the best, it is the one to choose. I don’t think 
he ever thought that it was analytic that if some option is best for some individual, 
some group, or the set of all possible individuals that this was the option to choose.  If 
we want to connect the sense of ‘good’ that has to do with interests to the sense of 
‘good’ that is used in trying to attribute the goodness property to some thing, we 
should demand an argument in support of any view that posits some entailment 
between claims about the goodness property and a subject’s interests.24 
                                                        
23 See Almotahari and Hosein (2015) for discussion.  
24 An anonymous referee pointed out that Goldman (1999: 88) might provide part of 
the argument requested in arguing that a subject's interests (e.g., in answering 
questions, satisfying curiosity, etc.) have significant implications when it comes to 
determining the total good realized by our epistemic state. (He suggests, for example, 
that a subject's failure to have answers to uninteresting questions might not matter for 
the score we assign to their belief states.)  I fear that Goldman's arguments can only 
give us part of what we want. They don't speak to the problem that mere accuracy of a 
belief about some interesting or important might be insufficient for the realization of a 
value. They also don't speak to the problem that the inaccuracy of a state should be 
sufficient for the realization of disvalue quite apart from the interest we take in the 
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 One of the advantages of thinking of epistemic goodness in terms of things 
that are good for a subject is that we don't have to make sense of the idea that there 
are things that are good simpliciter. Another is that it might seem to handle some of 
our intuitions about the importance of being able to track reality. We've already seen 
that these intuitions seem to cause trouble for veritism, so it would be good if we had 
a view that made some sense of them. In spite of this, we should reject both views.  
 It's important to the consequentialist project that rightness or rationality is 
determined by the interplay of some norm that tells us how value relates to rationality 
or rightness and how the options rank in terms of the total value they contain. The 
veritist ranks options in terms of the total amount of true beliefs. The gnostic ranks 
them in terms of total amount of knowledge.  On the veritist view, the rational belief 
is the one that's part of the option that contains the greatest total amount of epistemic 
goodness (determined by adding up the values realized by the accurate states and 
subtracting out the disvalue realized by the inaccurate ones). On the gnostic view, the 
rational belief is the one that's part of the option that contains the greatest total 
amount of epistemic goodness (determined by adding up the values realized by the 
states that constitute knowledge and subtracting out the disvalue realized by the states 
that fail to constitute knowledge).  
 The trouble with this way of thinking about things is there is a potential gap 
between the probability that a particular state is accurate or constitutes knowledge and 
the probability that the good particular states will be part of the best option.  Take a 
simple example. You might have thought that Trump would never be the GOP 
nominee and thought that you would never change your mind about this. As the 
evidence comes in, you might come to see that the first belief isn't quite as likely as 
you might have hoped. What about the second belief? If you manage to 'resist' 
modifying your first belief in light of the evidence, you just might be able to sustain 
this knowledge that you'll never change your mind. So, part of the cost of updating in 
light of the evidence is that you'd lose knowledge that you could have retained. 
Depending upon how the numbers work out, you can get cases where the kosher 
beliefs are too costly to keep or form and the bad beliefs are too costly not to form or 
too costly to drop. 
 We tend not to think that the way to show that a belief is rational is to show 
something about the extrinsic epistemic value associated with its formation, revision, 
or retention.  A bad belief isn't rational by virtue of carrying with it good epistemic 
consequences that couldn't be acquired otherwise. This is the notorious problem of 
epistemic trade offs.25  The problem is actually somewhat worse on gnosticism than it 
is on veritism. There is no interesting relationship between the truth or falsity of a 
particular belief and its rational standing. There is an interesting relationship between 
the rational standing of a belief and its status as knowledge. It's plausible that if you 
know p, your belief about p is rational.  The normative status that we're trying to 
understand in terms of the interplay of ranked options and norms that use this ranking 
to determine a belief's status uses that status in the ranking.  This is incoherent. It's 
                                                                                                                                                              
relevant issues.  For a helpful discussion of these issues, see Cote-Bouchard 
(forthcoming).   
25 The problem first is discussed in Firth (1981). Jenkins (2007) presents a version of 
the worry in discussing epistemic entitlement. In Littlejohn (2012), I appealed to these 
intuitions about tradeoffs to attack epistemic consequentialism.  The same sort of 
objection to epistemic consequentialism is also found in Berker (2013) and Greaves 
(2014).  See also Carr (2015).        
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equivalent to building rightness into the states of affairs we use in ranking options and 
then trying to use the ranking to determine which state of affairs we might rightly 
bring about.  This is incoherent for two reasons. First, it is incoherent because it 
allows that there's something that's independent from the ranking that determines the 
status. (Otherwise, the status couldn't figure in the ranking.) Second, it is incoherent 
because it should allow that one of the things rightly brought about would be wrong to 
bring about because of where it stands in the ranking. (If we assume the Totalizing 
Thesis, it should be possible for a 'right' action to figure in options that rank very low 
simply because alternative options contain more 'right' actions.) 
 It looks as if there is a simple argument from gnosticism to the denial of 
epistemic consequentialism. Suppose it's rational to believe p if you know p. Whether 
you know p or not depends upon things like whether your belief about p is safe, not 
upon whether your belief about p is part of an option that contains the greatest amount 
of epistemic goodness. (The consequentialists have to concede this. They cannot say 
that a belief's status as knowledge is dependent upon the ranking because the ranking 
is given in terms of the amount of knowledge contained in the options.) Having 
conceded this, however, they cannot then say that rationality is determined by how the 
options are ranked. If an item of knowledge is included only in suboptimal options, it 
is nevertheless a rational belief.  
 Epistemic rationality does not permit or require tradeoffs when it comes to 
knowledge. Because epistemic consequentialists have to allow for tradeoffs, their 
view is at odds with gnosticism. Once we see that tradeoffs are not allowed, we 
should see that it is implausible that knowledge is good simpliciter. If we thought that 
it was, we would think that tradeoffs would be allowed if only there were no side-
constraints that prohibited it. Even if we thought that such side-constraints existed, we 
would think that there was something regrettable about not being able to make the 
tradeoff. We don't think that. We don't think that it's regrettable that someone knows p 
when that knowledge precludes knowing some other things.  (For example, if you 
know that you are a star pupil, you know that you'll never know that you don't know 
much about history, that you'll never know that you don't know much about biology, 
that you'll never know that you don't know much about science books, etc...).   
 
4.2 The Remaining Options 
There are other uses of 'good' to consider. We often treat ‘good’ as an attributive 
adjective. In saying that something is a good book, we don’t seem to be saying that it 
has the property of being a book and the property of being good.  In saying that 
something is a good book and that some second thing is a good toaster, we aren’t 
saying that they share something in common. On this use, ‘good’ does not function to 
attribute the property of goodness to anything.  When we say of some book that it is a 
good book, we are saying that it is good as a book or good for a book. There is some 
standard of evaluation that we use to evaluate books, and the good book comes up to 
snuff.  
 There is a final use of ‘good’ that is not evaluative at all. In saying that it 
would be ‘good’, ‘better’, or ‘best’ if something is done, we often mean to say that it 
is good because it should be done. Such things are good because required, not 
required because good. Consider this example.26  Suppose one pile contains thousands 
of tickets for an upcoming lottery and another contains a handful. Suppose that 
                                                        
26 Thanks to Julien Dutant for the example. For discussion, see Dutant (2013) and 
Piller (2009). 
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nobody knows this yet, but the smaller pile contains the winning ticket. While the best 
outcome would be the one in which you pick the smaller pile, it would be best (and 
better and good) for you to pick the first. One seems evaluative and the other does 
not.  If I say that it would be good to keep your lunch date or best to visit your sick 
relative, this might simply be my way of trying to get you to see that you have most 
reason to do these things and I might not base this judgment on any calculation of 
total value. Indeed, I might know full well that no calculation of total value would 
support such a claim. I might say, for example, that it would be best for you to do 
something even if I know full well that this wouldn’t be what’s best for the affected 
parties.  
 When it comes to the Promotion and Totalizing Theses, it is clear that these 
theses are plausible only for good simpliciter and good-for.27 If something is good 
only in the sense that it is a good instance of a kind, it does not make much sense to 
measure its goodness and then use this to rank options from better to worse. (If two 
toasters are good toasters and only one toaster is needed to toast things, the state of 
affairs that contains two does not seem better than the state of affairs that includes just 
one. If there is no need to toast anything at all, there is still a perfectly good 
distinction to drawn between good and bad toasters, but it also seems that there is no 
reason to think that the presence of absence of such toasters matters much to the 
ranking of options.)  If something is good only in the sense that it is a good instance 
of a kind, it needn’t call for promotion.  The good-making features of a good book or 
toaster do not call for promotion.  If something is good in the sense that it is 
normatively good (i.e., good because right or appropriate) and we can determine this 
without appeal to its role in determining rankings, this notion of good cannot be the 
one that's at play in the Totalizing Thesis. Even if it called for promotion, the fact that 
it called for promotion quite independently from considerations about the ranking of 
options is a fact that would cause trouble for the consequentialist. The stuff that we 
used to establish the propriety of the act or attitude renders the ranking otiose.  
 Once we see that the truth in gnosticism is captured by the idea that beliefs 
that constitute knowledge are good instances of a kind or good precisely in that they 
conform to the norms that govern belief, we can see that the truth in gnosticism 
reveals the falsity of epistemic consequentialism. It doesn't make sense to rank 
options in terms of the amount of good they contain and the idea that we should 
promote the relevant goods by choosing the option that contains the most of it 
conflicts with the apparent platitude that knowledge is all you need to rightly believe 
that something is so. 
 
5. The Priority Thesis 
Lynch captured something important about epistemic value. It's something that's easy 
to miss if we're fixated on questions about the value of truth and don't think about the 
possible differences between veritism and gnosticism. He's right that there is 
something good about beliefs that 'track reality', but mistaken if he thinks that all 
accurate beliefs track reality. We want accuracy, but we want more besides. The 
experience machine is all we need to demonstrate this.  Someone can be in the 
experience machine and luck into the occasional true belief.  In having such beliefs, 
however, they are not 'tracking' reality.  If someone believes correctly that, say, her 
sister is being awarded her doctorate just when it happens to be that her sister is being 
awarded her doctorate, the subject isn't smiling for the reason that her sister is being 
                                                        
27 See Baron (1995) for a helpful discussion of value and reasons to promote. 
 18 
awarded her doctorate. You can be totally out of touch with reality even when you 
have accurate beliefs.  
 Only beliefs that constitute knowledge track reality. There's no obvious value 
in having a true belief that doesn't track reality. The occasional accidentally accurate 
attitude formed in the experience machine does not track reality, put a subject in touch 
with reality, or enable her to believing things, feel things, or do things in light of how 
things are. Thus, it's hard to see that there's anything left of the idea that all true 
beliefs are intrinsically good or that any state of affairs in which someone believes a 
truth is one that is good. The very same examples that we can use to challenge the 
idea that all true beliefs are good can be used to challenge the idea that all true beliefs 
are good for us.  Just as it's obvious that there are true beliefs that don't make you 
better off overall, the experience machine makes it obvious that there are some true 
beliefs that don't make you better off in any way.  When you think about the cases 
where the relevant belief is true but does not track reality, it is hard to see how this 
kind of failure to track reality could be something that makes even a small 
contribution to your well-being.  
 Once we abandon these two ideas about the good of true belief, we should 
then ask whether there is any sense in which true beliefs are good simply by virtue of 
being true. It shouldn't come as a surprise that I think there is not. While I think there 
is something important about what Lynch says, the importance of it will be lost if we 
don't pursue this idea of his that the beliefs that have epistemic value are those that 
track reality.  Three things are true about the good of true beliefs. First, the true 
beliefs that are good are those that constitute knowledge. Their status as knowledge is 
essential to understanding the sense in which they are good. Second, that the sense in 
which they are good is that such beliefs are good beliefs. Third, there is a further 
sense in which it is good to believe these beliefs, which is simply that such beliefs are 
the right ones to hold. 
 Let's consider the two ways in which it is plausible to say that knowledge is 
good:  
Attributive Goodness: Knowledge is good in the sense that a 
belief that constitutes knowledge is a good belief (i.e., it is good 
precisely because it can do what beliefs are supposed to do 
much in the way that a good toaster is good precisely because it 
can do what toasters are supposed to do).  
Normative Goodness: It is good to know in the sense that 
believing what you know ensures that you conform to the norm 
that governs belief (i.e., in this sense it is good because it 
conforms to the norm). 
To understand the thesis about attributive goodness, it helps to understand why it 
matters that beliefs track reality.  The best answer is that it matters whether we are 
guided by reasons and reasons are truths.28  Reasons that consist of facts can only 
rationally guide us when we believe them to obtain and our beliefs track the part of 
reality that consists of the relevant facts.  To be guided by a reason, the reason has to 
capture the light in which you took the relevant response to be appropriate. If your 
reason for driving to the store was that you were out of gin and bitters, it was the fact 
that you were out of the essentials that you took it that heading to the store was the 
thing to do.  If you didn't take yourself to be out of gin or out of bitters, the mere fact 
                                                        
28  See Alvarez (2010), Hyman (2015), Littlejohn (2012), Unger (1975), and 
Williamson (2000) for defenses of this idea. 
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that you were couldn't have convinced you that you should head to the store. Not only 
do you need belief to be guided by the fact if you didn't believe it to be a fact, you 
also need knowledge to be guided by it. This is what the experience machine shows.  
Only beliefs that enable you to be guided by such reasons are good beliefs. Putting 
you in touch with the facts so that they can guide your thoughts, feelings, and actions 
is a virtue of a belief just as the power to toast bread is a virtue of a toaster and being 
sharp is a virtue of a knife. 
 There is a further sense in which it is good to believe truths. It is normatively 
good to believe p when you know p.  The idea here is that it is good to believe only 
when you know because it is only then that you conform to the norms governing 
belief.29 The good comes from norm conformity, so it is not a kind of good that 
explains why some norm is in force.  If knowledge is the fundamental standard that 
we use to evaluate beliefs, a belief is good because it meets this standard. It would be 
a mistake to say that beliefs that constitute knowledge do so because they are good in 
some further way where the goodness makes the belief meet the standard.30 
 As I said above, these claims about the value of knowledge pose a problem for 
consequentialism.  Suppose knowledge suffices for rationality. Suppose further that 
the conditions that determine whether a belief constitutes knowledge can obtain 
independently from whether that belief is included in the best options. If so, it would 
be wrong to say, as consequentialists must say, that the status is determined by the 
ranking of options. What about the Priority Thesis? While I think we have to reject 
the Totalizing and Promotion Theses, the Priority Thesis might well be correct. Allow 
me to explain. 
 According to the Priority Thesis, the good is prior to the right.  If rightness, 
rationality, or justification were an ingredient of knowledge, we would have a neat 
and tidy argument against the thesis. Unfortunately, I see no good reason to accept the 
                                                        
29 See Williamson (2000) for a defense. 
30  It might seem that the proposal faces an obvious objection. If knowledge is 
attributively good and normatively good but not good in any further sense, it's hard to 
see how there could be any rational pressure to conform to the knowledge norm.  The 
account seems to deny that there is some reason to promote the good that comes from 
conforming to it.  Here is one avenue of response. We could say that the knowledge 
norm is categorical in the sense that it applies to any subject that can be held 
responsible for her attitudes. On every occasion, the norm determines whether our 
beliefs are as they should be. On these occasions, though, there might be different 
reasons (e.g., non-epistemic reasons) that determine the importance of conforming to 
the norm.  On this model, the standards that apply to belief apply categorically but the 
normative pressure to meet this standard varies from one occasion to another (e.g., on 
the basis of the importance of meeting or failing to meet the standard). A similar but 
different view might be that the normative pressure to conform to the norm applies 
equally across all the cases but is nevertheless a pressure that comes from outside of 
epistemology. Perhaps the practice of trying to meet epistemic standards and being 
held to such standards serves some non-epistemic purpose. The point is that the 
standard's content might be determined by one thing and the normative pressure for 
meeting this standard might derive from something else entirely. So, even if 
knowledge is not good simpliciter or good for you, there might be some further good 
that explains why you ought to revise your beliefs as if it did matter that you believed 
only what you know.  We find suggestions for developing some of these ideas in 
recent work by Maguire and Woods (MS) and Owens (2012).    
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idea that rightness, rationality, or justification is an ingredient of knowledge. For all 
that's been said, these might merely be necessary conditions on knowledge and the 
claim that something is a necessary condition on knowledge implies nothing about 
priority. Indeed, for all that's been said, these might not even be necessary conditions 
on knowledge, in which case there wouldn't be any tension between gnosticism and 
the Priority Thesis at all. 
 In arguing against consequentialism, I did say that knowledge suffices for 
rationality, which is equivalent to saying that rationality is necessary for knowledge. 
Let me make one qualification that does not affect the previous argument. In arguing 
from gnosticism to the rejection of consequentialism, I did not need the strong 
premise that every case of knowledge is a case of rational belief, only the much 
weaker premise that there are some cases of knowledge that are cases of rational 
belief where the total amount of good realized by holding onto the rational belief is 
less than the total amount of epistemic good that could be realized in some alternative 
option that does not include this belief.  There are plausible cases of knowledge 
without rational belief or justified belief. Some non-human animals know things. So 
do children. 
 To my mind, it makes perfectly good sense to say that Agnes knows that I 
have come home from work even if Agnes is a dog.31  If Agnes is the right kind of 
non-human animal (Dog? Hamster? Turtle? Spider? Fish? Flea?), it might make 
perfectly good sense to say that she knows things and yet be odd to say that her 
doubts, emotions, or beliefs are justified.  A cow might perform an action that is 
optimific, but I don't think that they would act rightly, not even if the 
consequentialists are right about rightness.  To know or perform an act that is 
optimific, one does not need the capacities required for accountability, but such 
capacities are required for being justified or rational.  
 This possibility is enough to show that a belief that is attributively good need 
not be normatively good. Once we have that, the gnostic can consistently say that they 
accept the claim about attributive goodness and say that a belief is an instance of a 
good belief iff it is knowledge. They can then say that in the special case where we 
are dealing with creatures that can be held accountable or responsible, attributive and 
normative goodness coincide. This position is consistent with the Priority Thesis. The 
reason that it is normatively good to believe only what you know is precisely that 
these are the beliefs that are attributively good. The view is teleological but not 
consequentialist.32 It is teleological because the norm that governs belief tells us that 
                                                        
31 Thanks to Maria Alvarez for pressing me on whether I thought that non-human 
animals had to have justified beliefs in order to have knowledge. It's possible that I 
did not quite capture the point she was making. If I haven't captured her point, I 
would happily claim credit for the point I thought she had made. 
32  Mehta (forthcoming) defends a view that is also teleological without being 
consequentialist. He thinks that knowledge is a standard of success and that it grounds 
further epistemic norms. I don't know if he would accept my explanation as to why 
knowledge is good (i.e., that the fundamental good that attaches to belief attaches to 
those beliefs that provide potential motivating reasons), but the view being proposed 
here is hardly the first attempt at stating a view that is both teleological and non-
consequentialist. Indeed, my aim in (2012) was to show that the right way to derive a 
theory of epistemic norms was to identify the point or purpose of beliefs (i.e., which 
is to provide reasons) and work from there (e.g., explain why conforming to the 
norms of belief requires not just accuracy but non-accidental accuracy).   
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the beliefs we ought to have are the beliefs we ought to have because they perform a 
function or serve some aim. The view is non-consequentialist because the good that 
such beliefs realize is not one that calls for promotion and doesn't determine what's 
right or rational by ranking options in terms of total value. 
 On the consequentialist view, we cannot determine whether something is right 
until we work out the total value of the various options and see whether it is contained 
in the options that rank highly enough. Satisficers and maximizers disagree about 
whether the right option has to be tied for first, but they both accept the Totalizing 
Thesis and Promotion Thesis.  If you accept the Totalizing Thesis, you have to think 
that the normative status of an action or attitude isn't something we can discern just by 
thinking about its merit in isolation from the other actions or attitudes contained in the 
options that contain it. An act that brings about some positive outcome isn't justified 
by that fact. The justification of this act turns on whether there were feasible 
alternatives that would be overall better.  If the epistemic consequentialists are 
consequentialists, they have to think that the same would hold for attitudes that realize 
some good. An attitude that has no value might be justified because it is part of an 
option that ranks sufficiently high and an attitude that has value might not be justified 
because it is only included in options that do not rank highly enough.   
 Ross thought that when we think about situations in which we harm or help 
others, we can see that there is something wrong with the consequentialist attitude 
towards beneficence and maleficence.  To determine whether we have violated a duty 
of beneficence or maleficence, Ross thought, we need to look to the results brought 
about (i.e., whether we harmed or helped), which is not the same as looking to these 
consequences along with those associated with all the feasible alternatives to see 
where the action ranked (i.e., to determine whether the harmful or helpful action was 
included in the option that maximized the good).  If you injure someone, you have 
committed a wrong even if had you not acted someone would have brought about the 
very same injury.  If you falsely describe someone in a less than flattering light, this is 
a wrong. It is a wrong even if that person would have been described in an even less 
flattering light by two more malicious slanderers had you remained silent.  In the 
epistemic case, when we're evaluating our attitudes as we should, we focus on 
whether these attitudes are accurate or would constitute knowledge.   
 When we assess a belief, we do focus on the features that matter to veritists 
and gnostics (i.e., accuracy and the conditions required for knowledge), but we do not 
see the relevance of these features as the consequentialists do. We care about an 
aspect of the result of settling a question (i.e., whether the answer is one we know to 
be correct), not the way that all of our options were ranked in terms of the total value 
realized by our other attitudes in these possibilities.  We do not think that the accuracy 
of some attitude matters only because of its effect on total accuracy and we certainly 
think that it does matter even if this accurate attitude is one that is held only in 
suboptimal options. 
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